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development in inland areas and gradual reform of monetary policy.
However, agricultural policies need further reform, including abandoning of
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agricultural marketing and distribution activities, and reform of the state
grain storage system.  Hopefully, WTO membership will assist
implementation of these reforms.
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This paper reports the results of a three-year collaborative research project
that has explored various implications of China’s accession to the WTO,
particularly those relating to agricultural policy and the agricultural sector,
and to the issue of food security.  The collaboration has been between
researchers at the National Centre for Development Studies and the School
of Economics at The Australian National University and researchers at the
China Center for Economic Research, Peking University.
The project was begun prior to China’s accession to the WTO.  It was
anticipated that the accession application would be successful and that it was
important therefore to understand fully the impact that the accession
commitments could have within China.  There was a concern to see that
Chinese policy makers appreciated the benefits that would flow from the
trade liberalisation.  At the same time it was understood that the trade
reforms would lead to structural adjustments that would involve the
reduction of some activities with the ensuing loss of employment and asset
values.  It was felt that it was preferable for policy makers to have an
understanding of these consequences as such understanding would reduce the
chances of the adoption of poor policies in response to any perceived or
actual adverse impacts.  Another objective of the project was to analyse
various policy options in order to offer input into China’s policy-making
process.
China made substantial commitments to freer trade in agriculture in its
accession agreement.  Underlying these commitments, therefore, is a
substantial shift away from its previous basic agricultural policy position,
which had an emphasis on food “self sufficiency”.  As might be expected,
there remains strong support in favour of food self sufficiency.  Therefore,
one of the aims of this research project was to demonstrate the costs of food
self-sufficiency policies to reduce the chances of any move back towards
such policies.
Other issues that the project planned to research were: (i) the nature of the
transition from the status quo to the implementation of the accession
commitments; (ii) the agricultural commodity impacts of the commitments;
and (iii) the distributional impacts of the commitments, specifically the rural-
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urban income impacts and the regional impacts.  Importantly, the project has
had a strong general equilibrium focus, which has been followed through the
use of global and China-specific computable general equilibrium models and
the analysis of the impact of all of China’s WTO accession commitments,
not only its agricultural commitments.  The focus on general equilibrium
research has two, related justifications.  First, when analysing the impacts of
agricultural policies, we should look beyond the agricultural sector because
agricultural policies will have economy-wide impacts.  Analogously, trade
policy initiatives in other sector will have impacts on the agricultural sector.
Further, the impact of macro-economic policies on particular sectors can be
as important, if not more important, than sector-specific policies.  Second, it
is clear from recent experience in developing countries that incomes of rural
households are increased more by increases in off-farm income earned by
household members than by increases in on-farm income.  Therefore, in
examining the welfare implications for farm households of the trade
liberalisation, it is important to examine all the ways in which farm
household incomes may be affected through the structural adjustments to the
trade reforms.
The research project was designed to give particular attention to the
differences among regions and households.  China is a very large country
with significantly different sub-economies, having different patterns of factor
endowments and therefore different comparative advantages; and there are
large differences among regions with respect to their stage of development.
Agricultural policy reform (and other policy changes) will therefore impact
differently on the different sub-economies and regions.  Likewise, the urban
and regional households with different factor endowments and different
income levels will be affected differently by the policy reforms.  In order to
examine these regional and household effects, a CGE model of the Chinese
economy was constructed with regional and household differentiation.
In effect, the project has four dimensions.  First, there is the commodity
dimension—the analysis of which agricultural industries gain and which lose
from the trade liberalisation.  Second, there is the household dimension.  The
concern for food security must relate to household incomes, not individual
incomes.  Moreover, as rural poverty will be largely overcome through the
earning of off-farm income by households, there has to be an economy-wide
approach to this issue.  The growing gap between urban and rural incomes is
a matter of great concern in China.  Therefore, the analysis allowed for
differentiation of representative rural and urban households to study the
impacts of policies on both kinds of households.  Third, as noted above, the
regional dimension is important in the examination of commodity effects and
income effects.  Finally, the problems within the agricultural sector will not
necessarily be resolved through agricultural policies.  Problems such as rural
poverty and the increasing urban-rural income gap may be best overcome
through macro-economic policies or through policies affecting other sectors
such as industrial policies, education policies, or internal migration policies.4
This paper reports the results of the research carried out in terms of these
four dimensions of the project.  However, first there is a discussion of the
issues of food self sufficiency and food security in China.
Food self sufficiency and food security
Maintenance of grain self sufficiency has long been a major plank of China’s
agricultural policy.  As recently as 1996, the Vice-Minister of Agriculture,
Wan Baorui (1996), announced that the grain self-sufficiency rate was to be
maintained at above 95 per cent.  Along with the widening of per capita
income disparities between rural and urban areas, the rhetoric of food self-
sufficiency is the most prominent weapon of China’s protectionists.  There
has been a concern that China will go the way of Japan, Korea and Taiwan
and protect its agricultural sector as the sector shrinks in relative importance
and national per capita incomes increase.  China’s accession to the WTO
may have come just in time to make this possibility less likely.  However,
while WTO accession lessens the risk that they will succeed, the agriculture
ministry has been assigned a prominent role in trade policy formation and
negotiation, with the power to press for further agricultural protection on
self-sufficiency as well as distributional grounds (Anderson et al. 2002, Tong
2003).
That there exists genuine concern for food self-sufficiency in China is
understandable.  Widespread famines have been experienced, although, in
hindsight, these have probably been due more to bad policies than to bad
weather.  Concern over the possibility of food trade embargoes can also be
understood; although, again, experience has shown that trade embargoes are
very difficult to implement (Lu 1997, Yang 2000).  The difficulty of
financing large volumes of food imports would also have been a legitimate
concern in the past.  However, this is no longer the case.  In 2000, China’s
total export revenue was around US$250 billion.  Imports of 22 million tons
of grain (the WTO import quota commitment) would cost US$3-4 billion—
only a small fraction of total export earnings.
But food self-sufficiency is not the same as food security.  Food security is a
matter of whether households have sufficient income to maintain an adequate
diet.  The important question with respect to food self-sufficiency for China
is the extent to which it is prepared to rely upon the international market for
the gap between its domestic production and its effective demand. China is
such a large country that, inevitably, most of the goods and services
consumed have to be produced domestically.
To illustrate the economic costs of adopting policies that aim to maintain
grain self-sufficiency near the present level or to increase it, protectionist
scenarios were modelled by Duncan et al (2003) using an adaptation of the
GTAP model
2, a global, multi-region, multi-product general equilibrium
model.  Following Yang and Tyers (2000), to the standard GTAP base was
added independent representations of governments’ fiscal regimes, with both
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direct and indirect taxation, as well as separate assets in each region
(currency and bonds) and monetary policies with a range of alternative
targets.
In earlier analysis, Yang and Tyers (1989) used a global agricultural sector
model to examine the impact of rapid income growth in China on the
composition of food consumption and the implications of this for food self-
sufficiency.  They found that the anticipated redistribution of consumption
toward livestock products would raise import demand for feed grains and
that this would make the maintenance of self-sufficiency through protection
very costly.  Because their analysis was restricted to the agricultural sector,
however, they could not examine the redistribution and economy-wide
effects of the protection needed to maintain self-sufficiency.  The use of the
GTAP model overcomes these limitations.
The modeling first projects the base case to 2010 under conservative output
and productivity growth assumptions and then asks two questions.  First, if
China’s present food self-sufficiency rates are to be held constant to 2010,
will increases in protection be required?  Second, what increases in
protection would be required to achieve full food self-sufficiency by 2010
and what would be the economy-wide and distributional effects of this
protection?  Consistent with Yang and Tyers (1989) the base case projection
to 2010 shows substantial declines in Chinese food self-sufficiency (see
Table 1), particularly for beverages, livestock products and feed grains
(basically as the result of income growth), so that substantial increases in
protection are needed to maintain the 2001 levels.  To achieve self-
sufficiency in all agricultural products by 2010, considerable further
protection would be required.  In both cases this protection would be
contractionary and redistributive, and it would retard growth in other sectors.
The strength of the results notwithstanding, sensitivity analysis shows they
rest quite heavily on some parameters, particularly the income elasticity of
demand for livestock products.
Table 1: Food self-sufficiency in China, 2001 to 2010 (percentages)
Commodity 2001 2010
Rice 100 100
Beverages   99   91
Other crops   94   89
Livestock   99   95
Processed food   88   83
Fish   99   99
Minerals   95   94
Energy   80   80
Source: Duncan, et al (2003).
The model employs the original GTAP CDE (constant difference of
elasticities of substitution) system.  Its non-homotheticity is an asset in that it
permits a range of income elasticities to exist either side of unity.  While this
system is more general than the homothetic ones often used in such models,6
it is still restrictive in the width of the parameter range compared to still more
general systems.  The CDE system is employed here because of its
parametric economy.  Because of the restrictiveness of the CDE system the
lower bound for the income elasticity of rice cannot be set below 0.1, despite
evidence suggesting that it is now negative (Ito et al. 1989, Peterson et al.
1991).  As a result, the differences between the model’s income elasticities of
livestock products and processed foods, which are superior goods, and those
of grains are likely to be smaller than they actually are.  One consequence of
this is that the results likely underestimate the growth in demand for
livestock products and processed foods and hence they underestimate the
associated derived demand for cereal feeds and other agricultural inputs.
This means it is likely there is a downward bias in the estimates of the cost of
achieving and maintaining agricultural self-sufficiency.
Because the declines in self-sufficiency in the base case projection to 2010
are significant, the tariffs necessary to retain 2001 self-sufficiency rates are
substantial, particularly for the beverages, “other crops” and livestock
product groups (see Table 2).  These taxes on imports are, effectively, taxes
on all China’s trade.  Thus they also reduce China’s exports, causing
exporting industries to contract.  Overall, the increased protection induces a
one per cent contraction in GDP along with some restructuring across
industrial sectors.  The more heavily protected agricultural industries are
favoured, mostly at the expense of manufacturing, particularly light
manufacturing.
The additional tariffs required to achieve full food self-sufficiency by 2010
are very large, particularly on imports in the livestock products, processed
food and “other crops” groups (see Table 2).  These distort incentives in the
economy substantially, shifting resources into agriculture and contracting
both the manufacturing and service sectors.  Throughout the economy this
decline in allocative efficiency reduces returns to installed capital and
therefore investment.  The level of 2010 GDP is reduced by nearly two per
cent.  The tariffs that would achieve agricultural self-sufficiency in 2010
reduce exports from China’s growth powerhouse, its light manufacturing
industries, by one-half.  Domestic resources are reallocated to the agricultural
sector, raising costs in manufacturing and reducing the international
competitiveness of China’s manufacturing industries.  The resulting
misallocation of labour is particularly striking.  The higher tariffs cause
employment in agricultural and food processing activities to be substantially
greater, at the expense primarily of light manufacturing.
Higher agricultural tariffs raise land rents by a considerable margin but
reduce real wages and capital returns.  Real wages grow less in both
agriculture and the modern sector.  This is true for both production and
skilled workers, and it is also true for the owners of physical capital.  The
capital losses occur because the industries that are hurt by the tariffs are more
capital intensive than agriculture.  In the end, land holders are the only
winners from the tariffs.
Table 2: Changes in tariffs required for food self-sufficiency by 20107








Other crops 19.2 72.7
Livestock 39.2 78.7
Processed food 11.1 67.3
Fish 16.1 31.9
Source: Duncan et al (2003).  The changes in protection are shown as proportional changes
to nominal protection coefficients.
We might well ask: what is gained by the self-sufficiency?  Would food be
more readily available in China?  No.  China’s 2010 prices of imported foods
would be increased by up to 60 per cent through the increased tariffs and
even home-produced food products would be increased by at least 10 per
cent.  The key consequence of political significance would be a reduction in
interdependence with the global economy.  But this cuts two ways.  Reduced
reliance on food imports means curtailing the principal source of China’s
overall economic growth since the 1980s—access to foreign markets for its
labour-intensive goods.  Curtailed exports reduce its capital returns, thereby
cutting incentives for investment and, ultimately, the growth rate of its
economy.
Commodity, regional, and household impacts of accession
What are the likely impacts of China’s WTO accession in terms of
agricultural commodities, rural households, and agricultural regions?  In a
component of the project, Feng Lu (2001) examined the likely
commodity/regional impacts of the accession’s agricultural commitments.
This was done through the calculation of “production concentration indices”,
which Lu defined as the ratio of the sown area (or output) of the commodity
per capita of the agricultural population of a region divided by the same ratio
for the country.  The interpretation of the index is that a region has a
comparative advantage (disadvantage) in the commodity if the production
concentration index (PCI) is greater (less) than one (analogous to the use of
the export concentration index as a measure of “revealed” comparative
advantage).
The calculations show relatively high PCIs for the labour-intensive
commodities (vegetables, fruits, meats, and fish products) in the eastern
region, relatively low PCIs for these commodities in the western region, and
values in between for the central region.  On average, the eastern region has
comparative advantage in all four labour-intensive commodity groups.  The
central region has comparative advantage in vegetables and meat products
but not in fruits and fish products.  The western region does not have
comparative advantage in any of the four labour-intensive product groups.8
PCIs for the land-intensive products (grains, oil seeds, cotton, and sugar) are
relatively high for the western region, relatively low for the eastern region,
and in between for the central region.  The western region has comparative
advantage in all four land-intensive commodity groups, while the central
region has comparative advantage in grains, oil seeds and sugar.  In the
eastern region, only sugar has comparative advantage.
In assessing the adjustment impacts of the reduction in protection for
agricultural commodities, Lu (2001) argues that, in line with China’s
perceived comparative advantage, liberalisation will strengthen the tendency
for imports of land-intensive commodities and encourage exports of labour-
intensive commodities.  He expects that the export promotion effect will
follow closely the regional distribution of comparative advantage of labour-
intensive commodities.  As regards the negative import-substitution effect,
he postulates two possibilities: one possibility is that imports of land-
intensive products will largely substitute for domestic production in the
regions with relatively high domestic production costs for these
commodities.  The second is that imports will substitute for domestic
production in proportion to the existing regional concentration of the
commodities.
The two possibilities will have different implications for regional adjustment
costs.  The first is to be preferred as it allows the principle of comparative
advantage to play a larger role in resource allocation.  The second, less
desirable, possibility is in line with the policy stance that has emphasised
provincial grain self-sufficiency.  Under the first scenario, those provinces
with comparative advantage in both labour- and land-intensive commodities
will have relatively small adjustment costs.  Those provinces without
comparative advantage in labour-intensive or land-intensive commodities are
likely to be worst off as they will benefit least from the export expansion and
have to bear the largest adjustment costs.  The eastern region is seen as likely
to be the major beneficiary from export expansion of labour-intensive
products, while the inland regions are expected to have much smaller
benefits.  On the other hand, the coastal regions may experience a larger
share of the adjustment costs from the import growth while inland provinces
may have less adjustment.
Under the second scenario, the regional distribution of the import-
substitution effects changes considerably.  A large share of the adjustment
costs may be incurred by the central and western regions; i.e., they are likely
to have a combination of small export-promoting effects and large
adjustment costs.  This could result in an increase in the income gap between
the coastal and inland regions.
To maximise the likelihood for scenario one to materialise, agricultural
policies should be changed in a more market-oriented manner.  There should
be a move away from the emphasis on regional self-sufficiency.  As well, the
state monopolies in domestic marketing and distribution of bulk agricultural
commodities as well as in transport should be removed to allow goods to
flow more freely across provincial borders.9
Tingsong Jiang (2002a) examined the growing income gap between the
coastal and inland regions over the period 1978 to 2000.  He noted that the
gap was unchanged or had even declined during 1978-90—the period in
which China undertook major agricultural reforms and experienced high
growth in the agricultural sector.  This development favoured the poorer
regions that have higher agricultural shares in total output.  In the period
1991-2000, which followed the major industrial reforms, the eastern region
benefited most from growth of foreign investment and development of the
private sector.  During this time the regional income gap between the coastal
and inland regions widened considerably.  However, the income disparity
within the regions declined over this period.
The increasing gaps between rural and urban incomes and between incomes
in coastal and inland regions are of considerable concern in China.  The
likelihood of WTO accession increasing these disparities was a major factor
behind resistance to accession.  In a contribution to the project, Jiang (2003)
examined how WTO accession is likely to affect these income disparities
using a multi-commodity general equilibrium model of the Chinese
economy.  The model included representative rural and urban households in
order to study income distribution and regional impacts (for details of the
model see Jiang 2002(b) and 2003).  The CERD model (China Economy
with Regional Details) is based on the model constructed by Yang and
Huang (1997) but has been enhanced with the incorporation of provincial
input/output tables.  For the purposes of this study the I/O tables were
aggregated into three regions: eastern, central and western.
In simulations of the WTO accession commitments, crops, food processing,
motor vehicles and parts, and machinery sectors are adversely affected by the
accession, particularly the motor vehicles and parts sector.  Other sectors
benefit, particularly the light manufacturing sector.  Agricultural production
declines most in the eastern region and least in the central region.  This result
is contrary to that of Lu (2001), who concluded that the eastern region would
benefit most with respect to agriculture because of its comparative advantage
in labour-intensive activities.  Jiang’s results show the usefulness of general
equilibrium analysis, which has taken account of there being a higher return
to labour-intensive activities outside of agriculture in the eastern region.  The
eastern region does by far the best in overall terms because it realises most of
the gains in allocative efficiency.  Hence, there is an increase in regional
income disparity.  Rural household incomes increase most in the eastern
region because they have the best opportunities for off-farm income.
However, across the regions rural household incomes increase less than
urban household incomes.
Jiang (2003) undertook some simulations to examine the impacts of policies
that may be adopted to mitigate these adverse effects on farm incomes.  One
policy option tested is the use of a production subsidy.  It was found that if
agriculture were to be subsidised to maintain the pre-accession grain self-
sufficiency rate, the subsidy would be 7.2 billion yuan.  If the target were to
maintain the food self-sufficiency rate the subsidy would be 180 billion yuan.10
Another policy option tested was an increase in agriculture R&D to improve
agricultural productivity.  It was estimated that China would have to almost
double the level of agricultural R&D in order to maintain the food self-
sufficiency rate.
In one of his contributions to the project, Xiaolu Wang (2002) argued that the
underlying reason for the widening rural-urban income gap since 1991 is the
excess supply of labour in agriculture.  This excess supply results in low
labour productivity—much lower than in the industrial and tertiary sectors—
and slower growth in incomes.  As a result of the slower productivity growth
and the excess of labour in agriculture, the agricultural share of GDP fell
from 51 per cent in 1952 to only 14 per cent by 2002, while the share of
agricultural workers in the total work force declined from 84 per cent in 1952
to 50 per cent in 2002.  The share of the rural population in the national total
declined even more slowly—from 85 per cent in 1953 to 61 per cent in 2002.
The excess supply of labour in agriculture has been attributed to the
restrictions on the movement of people from rural areas to the cities,
accompanied by discrimination in the form of denial of access to housing,
education, job training and health facilities.
Because of the development of rural industries, the sources of rural
household income have changed remarkably.  In 1990 the agricultural share
of rural household incomes was 74 per cent.  By 2002, this share had fallen
to 47 per cent.  The development of the rural industrial sector, particularly
the township and village enterprise (TVE) sector, was very important in
providing opportunities for diversification of rural household incomes.
Employment in the TVE sector increased from 28 million to 135 million in
the period 1978-96, accounting for more than one-quarter of the rural labour
force (Wang and Duncan 2003).  Despite this, the number of farmers has
increased and there appears to be more surplus agricultural labour than ever.
The diversification of rural household incomes varies greatly between the
major geographical regions, with the share of off-farm income in rural
households in the coastal region around 75 per cent but only around 25 per
cent in the western region.  Moreover, the rural-urban income disparity has
widened most in the western region: between 1980 and 2000 the rural/urban
income ratio fell from 54.4 per cent to 43.2 per cent in the eastern region,
from 49.5 per cent to 40.1 per cent in the central region, and from 44.9 per
cent to 30.4 per cent in the western region (Wang and Duncan 2003).
Development of rural industries slowed in the late 1990s, mainly due to
greater market competition, the unfavourable location of rural enterprises,
difficulties in accessing external finance, and lack of infrastructure, technical
inputs, and human resources.  Meanwhile, urbanisation accelerated and
larger numbers of rural labourers moved to urban areas in search of jobs.  In
2001, the urbanisation rate (the ratio of urban to total population) in China
reached 38 per cent, as compared to 26 per cent in 1990 and 19 per cent in
1980.
In spite of the acceleration of urban development, the urbanisation rate in
China is, on average, 10-20 percentage points lower than in other countries at11
a similar income level—even allowing for the so-called “floating population”
(Wang and Xia 1999).  In particular, there are relatively few medium and
large cities.  In 2001, 121 million people, only 9.6 per cent of the population,
lived in cities of more than 0.5 million people.  In the less-developed western
region, only 5.6 per cent of the population lived in cities of that size.  If
China had an urbanisation rate similar to that of other countries of a similar
income level, an additional 120-240 million people would be living in urban
areas.  This number may be thought of as the excess number of people in the
rural economy.  The constraints on urbanisation may be a factor behind the
increasing urban-rural income disparity.
Wang and Duncan (2003) note that there are positive correlations between
rural industrialisation (measured as the share of TVE employment in rural
labour) and rural incomes and between the urbanisation rate and rural
incomes.  They therefore undertook a causality test of the relationship
between urbanisation and regional economic growth.  Because both
urbanisation and rural incomes may be a function of economic growth, the
causality test was carried out within an endogenous growth model.  The
results from the modeling indicate that each percentage point increase in the
urbanisation rate increases provincial economic growth by 0.37 percentage
points above the already high 7-10 per cent growth rate, i.e., urbanisation has
a long-run impact on economic growth.  When regional dummies are
introduced, there are seen to be significant impacts from urbanisation on
economic growth in both the eastern and central regions, but the impact is
insignificant in the western region.  There may be two reasons for this latter
result: the rate of urbanisation in the western region has been low, and the
urban economy in the western provinces has not experienced much
restructuring , and is therefore less market-oriented and less efficient.
Macro-economic implications of accession
Most other studies of China’s WTO accession have focussed on the medium
and long-run impacts of the accession.  However, there are important short-
run issues, in particular those relating to the macro-economic policy
environment in which the reforms take place.  The study by Tyers and Rees
(2002) therefore examined the short-run impacts of the reforms under
scenarios of capital controls, fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, and
alternative fiscal policies.
An adaptation of the GTAP model similar to that used in Duncan, Rees and
Tyers (2003) was used for the analysis.  Because of the inclusion of
independent representation of governments’ fiscal regimes (with inclusion of
both direct and indirect taxation) and monetary policies with a range of
targets, it is possible to study a range of policy regimes.  To be representative
of short-run conditions, the model also allows for labour market rigidity and
departures from full employment.
In order to undertake the short-run analysis, a simulation of the long-run
effects of the accession commitments was first carried out.  The results
allowed for a derivation of investors’ expectations on the assumption that12
they take changes in long-run returns on installed capital into account in
determining short-run changes in their investment behaviour.  The results
from the long-run simulation show the expected allocative efficiency gains
from the trade reform, which are reflected in increased GDP, and increased
returns on installed physical capital that induce greater investment and larger
net inflows on the capital account.  The increased average long-run return on
installed capital is therefore part of investors’ expectations in the short run
and so tends to increase the level of investment in the short run—even if
capital controls are maintained.  The trade reforms also cause consumption to
switch away from home-produced goods and the relative prices of home-
produced goods to fall, and hence there is a real depreciation.  There is also
an increase in export competitiveness, and exports expand.
Manufacturing, particularly light manufacturing, is the main beneficiary of
the trade liberalisation, together with the transport sector.  This result, which
is contrary to intuition from the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade
model, derives from the model’s departure from the HOS model in two
ways—first, there is extensive use of intermediate inputs from the same
sector (intra-industry trade), and second, competing imports are
differentiated from home products.  Under these assumptions the tariff
reductions on imported intermediate inputs have a direct effect on the home
industry’s total cost.  The indirect effect of the reductions in tariffs on
competing but differentiated products depends upon the elasticity of
substitution between imports and home produced goods.  For manufacturing,
the input cost effect of tariff reductions is considerably greater than the
impact from the loss of protection against competing imports.  Cost
reductions of similar origin are the reason for the gains accruing to the
domestic transport sector.
As the reforms cause the most substantial reductions in protection in China’s
food processing sector and therefore lead to long-run contractions in rice and
“other crops”, there is substantial relocation of employment from agriculture
to the manufacturing, energy, and transport and other services sectors.
Simulations of short-run effects
For the short-run base case simulation, China is assumed to maintain a fixed
exchange rate against the US dollar and rigid capital controls, while nominal
wages are “sticky”.  The other regions specified in the model have inflation
and CPI targeting, no capital controls, full short-run nominal wage rigidity in
the industrial countries and fully flexible nominal wages elsewhere.
Government spending in all regions is assumed to absorb a fixed proportion
of GDP and the rates of direct and indirect taxes are constant, so that
government deficits vary in response to shocks.
Five different macro-economic regimes were simulated to study the impact
of the trade reforms:
(i)  rigid capital controls and fixed tax rates; monetary policy
targets the CPI and the exchange rate floats;13
(ii)  fixed exchange rate and fixed tax rates; there are no capital
controls;
(iii)  fixed tax rates, monetary policy targets the CPI, the exchange
rate floats, and capital controls are removed;
(iv)  rigid capital controls and a fixed exchange rate; the direct tax
rate adjusts to maintain the government deficit as a fixed
proportion of GDP; and
(v)  the closure is the same as (iv), however, capital controls are
removed.
The short-run effects of the trade reform vary considerably under the
different macro-economic regimes.  When capital controls are in place and
the exchange rate is fixed, the allocative gains from the tariff reductions are
insufficient to offset the contractionary effects of the deflation that is due to
the rise in the relative prices of foreign goods.  When capital controls are
weak, the trade liberalisation attracts increased inflows on the capital account
and mitigates the real depreciation and associated domestic price deflation.
The real volume of investment rises irrespective of the target of monetary
policy, as does the level of GDP.  The choice of monetary policy still
matters, however, with CPI targeting leading to a smaller GDP price
deflation, more modest gains in the real production wage, and better short-
run GDP gains.
As with monetary policy, the impact of the different fiscal policies depends
on the strength of capital controls.  Given tight capital controls, if tax rates
are held constant and the fiscal deficit expands, domestic interest rates rise
and private investment is crowded out.  Where income tax increases to
compensate for the tariff cut, there is less pressure on the domestic capital
market and the interest rate increase is less, as is the fall in investment.  In
the absence of effective capital controls, the case of no increase in the tax
rates performs better than the alternative policy.  The increased government
borrowing draws in international savings at international interest rates and
does not crowd out private investment.  However, both fiscal policies give
superior results in the absence of capital controls.
The key determinant of the short-run structural adjustment resulting from the
trade liberalisation is the size of the real depreciation.  The real depreciation
is larger when capital controls are in place.  Traded goods sectors such as
light manufacturing are advantaged while non-traded sectors are not.  When
there are no capitals controls, the manufacturing gains are smaller and the
non-traded services sectors also benefit.  Across the board, however, for the
same reasons as in the long-run simulation, agriculture and food processing
are disadvantaged by the reforms.  It is important to note that some relaxation
of the monetary policy regime can reduce the adverse effects in the
agricultural sector from the trade reform.  When capital controls are in place
and the exchange rate is fixed, almost the entire agricultural sector is hurt.
Where capital controls are in place but the exchange rate is floated, the
“other crops”, livestock and fisheries sectors expand.14
Employment in food processing falls regardless of the macro-economic
policy regime, however.  Significant structural change is required in the short
run with the movement of employment from agriculture to manufacturing;
however, in the long run, the size of the employment shift is smaller.  Under
either fiscal regime the greatest contraction in employment in food
processing occurs when capital controls are tight and monetary policy targets
the nominal exchange rate.  Unlike the long run, employment in the other
agricultural sectors is not necessarily contractionary—the outcome is
dependent upon the macro-economic policy regime.
In summary, if capital controls are too tight and the fixed nominal exchange
rate is retained, the reforms are deflationary.  If the labour market is slow to
adjust, employment growth will slow and the reform package will be
contractionary.  To obviate this, the government has to allow sufficient net
inflow on the capital account to at least maintain the level of domestic
investment.  If it does not do this, a small nominal depreciation would
achieve the same result.  The fiscal policy response to the loss of import
revenue has comparatively little influence over China’s economic
performance in the short run.  Regardless of whether government spending or
the government deficit is held constant, the optimal macro policy
environment is a floating exchange rate with no capital controls.
In a follow-up study to Tyers and Rees (2002), Chang and Tyers (2003)
analyse the slow-down in China’s income growth since the Asian financial
crisis.  In particular, they examine the slow-down in rural income growth and
the widening urban-income gap and ask to what extent this is due to: (i) the
remaining obstacles to rural-urban migration (as suggested by Ianchovichina
and Martin 2002), (ii) the WTO trade reforms (as suggested by Anderson et
al 2002), or restrictive macro-economic policies.  Using the GTAP model
adaptation of Tyers and Rees (2002)
3, the researchers test the extent to which
China’s fixed exchange rate and capital controls, and its WTO accession
commitments, have contributed to the relatively poor performance in the
rural sector.  The Asian crisis was seen as leading to a large (largely illegal)
outflow of capital.  This capital flight and the trade reforms are hypothesised
to have led to a real exchange rate depreciation.  The pegging of the yuan to
the US dollar has therefore necessitated a deflation.  If wages are “sticky”
and fall more slowly than prices, employment declines.  It is hypothesised
that the resulting real wage increase in the modern sectors has reduced labour
demand and hence “bottled up” workers in the rural sector and reduced rural
per capita incomes.
Analysis of the data shows that while restraints on rural-urban migration
have been relaxed to some extent, the migration flow has decreased rather
than increased.  The simulation results support the hypothesis that the fixed
exchange rate and the capital controls have restricted the flow of workers
from the rural sector.  The model shows the rate of migration into the
manufacturing sector falling by at least one percentage point per year and
                                                          
3 The key difference between the long-run analysis in this paper and that in Tyers and Rees (2002) is
that in the model used for the simulations reported in this paper there is an assumed positive
relationship between the trade reforms and productivity growth.15
into the services sector by at least two percentage points per year.  In all
sectors there is a stark contrast between employment growth under tight
capital controls and a fixed exchange rate regime on the one hand and an
open capital account and floating currency regime on the other.  Indeed, with
an expansionary macro-economic policy and optimistic assumptions about
the productivity effects associated with the WTO accession reforms,
simulated worker relocation demands from the reforms exceed the average of
China’s recent rural-urban performance.  This suggests that there is ample
scope for a more rapid rate of migration of labour out of the rural sector,
which would help reduce the rural-urban income gap.
Conclusions
Across the wide range of analysis carried out in this project, it is consistently
shown that the trade reforms China adopted in order to accede to the WTO
will mean substantial structural changes within the agricultural sector.
Looked at from a partial equilibrium agricultural perspective, the reforms
would be seen to result in substantial negative impacts across the sector and a
worsening of food security in the sense of reduced access to income.
However, it cannot be stated too strongly that the outcomes of the reform
have to be analysed from an economy-wide perspective.  In China, as in
other rural-based countries, the main factors behind reductions in rural
poverty will be the scope for rural households to earn off-farm income and
for people to move from rural areas into industrial and services activities in
urban centres.  Therefore, to a very large extent, the success of the trade
reforms will depend upon policies outside of agriculture.
There was considerable internal resistance to China joining the WTO, with
concern over food security (more commonly seen in China as food self-
sufficiency) and the perceived adverse impacts on the agricultural sector.
The analysis carried out in this project has confirmed that structural change
driven by productivity growth—which the trade reforms will promote—will
lead to agriculture becoming a smaller and smaller part of the economy.  As
incomes increase, consumption patterns change, and the share of agriculture
shrinks, China will become less self-sufficient in many commodities.
However, because it has such a large population, China will always have to
produce most of the foods that it consumes.  As the modeling has shown,
trying to hold this development at bay or reverse it would have exorbitant
costs (Duncan et al 2003).  No doubt, however, there will continue to be
resistance to the reforms in agriculture.  The large proportion of the
population that is still supported by agriculture can be a significant political
weapon.  Unfortunately, resistance to reforms can prevent the potential for
their incomes to increase from being exploited, thus providing further
ammunition for arguments to provide government support for the sector.  It
is important, therefore, that the economic arguments against “food self-
sufficiency” be made over and over.
The gap between urban and rural incomes has widened over the past decade
or so.  Partly, this is an outcome of the very rapid growth of the urbanised
industrial and services sector.  But it is also the result of a slowing of the16
growth of rural incomes.  This is partly the result of the slowdown in the
growth of the TVE sector and the lessened opportunities for rural households
to earn off-farm incomes.  Incomes in the agricultural sector have not grown
as rapidly as they could because of poor agricultural policies, such as
ineffective and costly price support policies, regional self-sufficiency
policies, and monopolistic marketing and distribution of bulk commodities,
fertilisers and seeds (Wang and Duncan 2003).  China’s accession to the
WTO should help to maintain pressure to bring about reforms in these areas.
The current government grain reserve system is inefficient in many respects
and very costly.  It is run by different government agencies at the central,
provincial and municipal levels, each with different interests and not very
clearly defined roles.  These arrangements give rise to conflicting interests in
operations dealing with market instability and cannot serve the goal of food
security well.  A smaller, well-managed grain reserve system with a clear,
single objective would better serve this goal.  However, it should be
understood that grain markets will never operate efficiently while there is a
government-run storage system, as it will crowd out efficient private storage.
The restrictions on rural-urban migration and constraints on the development
of urban centres have also restricted opportunities for the rural-urban income
gap to be reduced (Wang and Duncan 2003).  The research shows that
urbanisation has significant positive impacts on rural incomes and regional
economic growth.  The development of urban centres, particularly in inland
regions, appears to be a matter of high priority.  The “keep them down on the
farm” policy of China (and many other developing countries) seems to be
partly due to a concern about problems associated with urban development
such as congestion and pollution.  However, urban centres should be seen in
a positive light.  They exist because they provide efficiencies of scale and
scope.  Problems associated with cities largely derive from the lack of good
planning of infrastructure, inappropriate property rights to land, and
inappropriate taxes and subsidies.  China should therefore persist with
infrastructure development to promote inland cities as an offset to the
geographical disadvantages of the inland regions.  Otherwise, it will face
continued pressures for migration to the coastal cities.  Removal of the
remaining restrictions on rural-urban migration and the discrimination
against rural migrants should accompany the promotion of the development
of urban centres.
It is shown that rural households in the coastal region will do best from the
trade reforms as they have the most opportunity for earning income in off-
farm employment (Jiang 2003).  These opportunities arise because the non-
agricultural industries in the eastern region benefit most from the trade
reforms.  This is partly the result of the bulk of private sector development
having taken place in this region.  The government should reduce its support
of SOEs in the inland regions, which crowd out private enterprises.
However, the private sector also needs government to provide infrastructure
to overcome the geographical disadvantages of the inland regions.17
The modeling has also shown that China’s monetary policy regime of the
fixed yuan and capital controls has increased the rural-urban income gap by
raising real wages and reducing employment growth in the non-agricultural
sectors (Chang and Tyers 2003).  The results show that moving away from
this monetary policy regime could lead to a much more rapid relocation of
labour out of agriculture and thereby promote a reduction in the rural-urban
income gap.
A monetary policy regime change could also reduce the adverse impacts of
the WTO trade reforms on the agricultural sector.  Modeling with capital
controls in place and the fixed exchange rate results in almost the entire
agricultural sector being adversely affected by the tariff reductions.  Even
partial relaxation of the monetary policy regime may reduce this adverse
impact.  For example, when capital controls are in place but the exchange
rate is floated, the “other crops” livestock and fisheries sectors expand.
However, the government is right to undertake any change in its monetary
policy regime gradually and cautiously, as shown by the Asian financial
crisis.  Adoption of a floating exchange rate would be premature, considering
the underdeveloped state of China’s financial sector, its only partially
reformed banking sector, and its still-vulnerable state-owned enterprises.
The priority at this stage should be to accelerate the reforms in each of these
areas.
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